توافق هسته ای با ایران در دسترس است اگر…

متن مصاحبه با موسویان

موسویان:

·         توافق هسته ای با ایران در دسترس است اگر هدف واقعی ترامپ، رفع نگرانی از احتمال بمب هسته ای است

·         اگر هدف ترامپ تغییر رژیم در ایران باشد، دامنه بحران به جنگ منطقه‌ای یا حتی فرامنطقه‌ای، و فاجعه‌ای کامل کشیده خواهد شد.

امانپور: اجازه بدهید از شما بپرسم، چون ایران مجبور بود تصمیم‌گیری کند. ما پیش‌تر به‌تفصیل صحبت کردیم که چطور توان نظامی‌اش در داخل و همچنین توان نیابتی‌اش در خارج که همان نیروهای ضربتی‌اش هستند، تضعیف شده است. ایران در این زمینه واقعاً در وضعیت نامناسبی قرار دارد. اما رهبر عالی، آیت‌الله خامنه‌ای، باید تصمیم می‌گرفت، درست است؟ که دقیقاً چه کاری انجام دهد تا به‌زعم خود، از واکنش شدیدتر آمریکا جلوگیری کرده و بقای رژیم را حفظ کند. به نظر شما، آیا این محاسبه در درون حاکمیت در زمان تصمیم‌گیری درباره واکنش انجام شده بود؟

موسویان:  به نظرم همیشه هم از طرف ایران و هم از سوی طرف‌های مقابل، از جمله کشورهای غربی، “اشتباه محاسبات”صورت گرفته است. ما جنگ هشت‌ساله را به یاد داریم، زمانی که ایالات متحده، اروپا، اتحاد جماهیر شوروی و همه کشورهای عربی متحد شدند تا از تجاوز صدام حمایت کنند. آن‌ها پول، سلاح و پیشرفته‌ترین تجهیزات را در اختیار متجاوز قرار دادند. حتی در آن زمان، ایران موشک هم نداشت. روایت این بود که شاه رفته و ارتش ایران در هرج‌ومرج است، پس این بهترین زمان برای حمله و تجزیه ایران است. اما با وجود اجماع جهانی از بلوک شرق تا غرب و کشورهای عربی در حمایت از متجاوز، و با وجود صدها میلیون دلار کمک و سلاح پیشرفته به متجاوز، ایران مقاومت کرد و حتی یک میلی‌متر از خاک کشور را از دست نداد. صدام رفت و جمهوری اسلامی باقی ماند. یعنی همیشه این روایت‌ها اشتباه بوده‌اند…

امانپور: بسیار خوب. پس اجازه دهید ادامه دهم. درباره دهه ۱۹۸۰ صحبت می‌کنیم. آن زمان رهبر وقت، آیت‌الله خمینی گفت: «جام زهر را می‌نوشم» تا جنگ پایان یابد. آیا اکنون خامنه‌ای هم مجبور است همین کار را بکند؟ چون ترامپ گفته یا تسلیم شوید یا با پیامدهای آن مواجه شوید. آیا رهبر ایران مجبور است به گزینه‌ای فراتر از این واکنش فعلی بیاندیشد؟

موسویان: وقتی در سال ۱۹۸۸ آیت‌الله خمینی گفت جام زهر را می‌نوشد، به این دلیل بود که پیش از آن گفته بود تا زمانی که صدام سرنگون نشده، جنگ را ادامه خواهد داد. تنها تصمیمی که گرفت این بود که جنگ را بدون برکناری صدام پایان دهد. وگرنه او تحت رهبری خود، توتنست تمامیت ارضی کشور را حفظ کند.

اما درباره بحران فعلی، مهم‌ترین مسئله‌ای که روی میز است، چیست؟ آیا فقط مسئله هسته‌ای است یا فراتر از آن؟ من شخصاً معتقدم که هدف اصلی نتانیاهو، موضوع هسته‌ای نیست، بلکه تغییر رژیم و حتی تجزیه ایران است.

اینکه آیا این هدف، هدف آمریکاست یا نه، پرسش بزرگی است. آیا ترامپ واقعاً فقط درباره بمب هسته‌ای نگران است؟ یا او هم به دنبال تغییر رژیم است؟ اگر هدف او تغییر رژیم باشد، آن‌گاه می‌توان انتظار تشدید بحران، جنگ منطقه‌ای یا حتی فرامنطقه‌ای، و فاجعه‌ای کامل را داشت.

اما اگر موضوع فقط برنامه هسته‌ای ایران باشد، سه مسئله اصلی وجود دارد:

اول، همکاری ایران با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی برای حل سؤالات فنی و ابعاد احتمالی نظامی است. جان کری گفته بود که توافق هسته‌ای سال ۲۰۱۵ بالاترین سطح شفافیت، راستی‌آزمایی و بازرسی را در خود داشت. بنابراین در این زمینه می‌توان همان پارامترهای شفافیت توافق قبلی را مجدداً اجرا کرد، چون آن توافق قبلاً به‌طور کامل اجرا شده و تمامی ابهامات فنی آژانس برطرف شده بود.

مسئله دوم، ذخایر اورانیوم ایران است. جان کری گفت ایران قرار نداشت چنین ذخیره بزرگی داشته باشد. ترامپ از توافق خارج شد در حالیکه ایران هنوز به‌طور کامل به آن پایبند بود. اما در پاسخ به خروج ترامپ و اعمال مجدد تحریمها، ایران نیز تعهداتش در چارچوب برجام را کاهش داد و سطح و ظرفیت برنامه هسته‌ای خود را به‌عنوان اهرم چانه‌زنی افزایش داد.

امانپور: متوجه هستم. اما روشن است که این اهرم فشار به ضررشان تمام شد. آن‌ها فضا را اشتباه خواندند، اسرائیل را بعد از ۷ اکتبر اشتباه ارزیابی کردند، ترامپ را هم همین‌طور. بنابراین پرسش واقعی این است که آیا برای بازگشت به میز مذاکره، حاضرند—همان‌طور که کری اشاره کرده—دست از تعهد به نابودی اسرائیل بردارند و وارد کنسرسیومی شوند که شما هم در گذشته از آن صحبت کرده‌اید؟ کنسرسیومی که غنی‌سازی برای برنامه صلح‌آمیز در قلمرو رسمی ایران را ممکن می‌سازد. آیا چنین گزینه‌ای را در نظر خواهند گرفت؟

موسویان: من واقعاً نمی‌دانم موضع نهایی دولت ایران چه خواهد بود، چون در دولت نیستم. اما دو سه سال است که مرتب گفته و نوشته‌ام و معتقدم باید به تقابلات اسرائیل و ایران پایان داد و دو طرف باید آتش‌بس کنند. آن‌ها باید به منشور سازمان ملل بازگردند و از تهدید دست بردارند.

دوم، درباره توافق هسته‌ای و مسئله ذخایر اورانیوم است. من شنیدم که آقای عراقچی در اولین دور مذاکرات به آقای ویتکوف گفته بود که اگر توافقی حاصل شود، ایران آماده است ۴۰۰ کیلوگرم ذخایر خود را صادر یا رقیق کند. بنابراین دیگر نگرانی‌ای درباره ساخت ۱۰ بمب هسته‌ای باقی نمی‌ماند.

و نهایتاً، نگرانی درباره این است که غنی‌سازی ایران نظامی است یا غیرنظامی. اگر ایران زیر ۵ درصد غنی‌سازی کند، قطعاً غنی‌سازی صلح‌آمیز است.

در میان‌مدت و بلندمدت، همان‌طور که نوشته‌ام، می‌توان یک کنسرسیوم منطقه‌ای میان ایران، عربستان، امارات، قطر و دیگر کشورها تشکیل داد که تحت نظارت آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی باشد، مشابه کنسرسیوم اروپایی “یورنکو”. این طرح می‌تواند چندجانبه و تحت نظارت جامعه جهانی باشد.

امانپور: و نهایتاً، چون شما مذاکره‌کننده هسته‌ای سابق بوده‌اید، از معاون وزیر خارجه، آقای روانچی، پیش از ورود آمریکا به این جنگ پرسیدم که اگر رژیم باقی بماند—چون شما گفته‌اید اسرائیل به دنبال تغییر رژیم است—آیا ایران ممکن است در خفا تصمیم بگیرد بمب بسازد؟ او گفت: نه، هرگز. ما هرگز نخواستیم و نخواهیم. اما شما فکر می‌کنید اگر مذاکره‌ای شکل نگیرد، ممکن است چنین گزینه‌ای مثل کره شمالی روی میز قرار بگیرد؟

موسویان:  بستگی دارد به نحوه پایان وضعیت بحران فعلی. اگر آمریکا و اسرائیل حملات را متوقف کنند، ایران هم متوقف خواهد شد. اگر آمریکا به میز مذاکره بازگردد، ایران هم بازخواهد گشت. اگر آمریکا به قوانین بین‌المللی، از جمله معاهده NPT، احترام بگذارد، ایران آماده است توافقی با بالاترین سطح شفافیت، برنامه هسته‌ای باز داشته و نهایتا هم مشارکت در کنسرسیوم داشته باشد. اما اگر هدف، تغییر رژیم باشد و برنامه هسته‌ای فقط بهانه‌ای برای نابودی کامل کشور باشد، فکر می‌کنم در نهایت ایران به سمت ساخت بمب هسته‌ای خواهد رفت.

آمانپور: خُب، خدای من! این یک هشدار بود. آقای سید حسین موسویان، بسیار سپاسگزارم.

ذیلا متن انگلیسی اظهارات جان کری و موسویان

With Mousavian

https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/24/Tv/video/amanpour-iran-nuclear-seyed-hossein-mousavian

AMANPOUR: Let me ask you though, because Iran had to make a decision, obviously, we’ve spoken in depth about how it has been weakened, both with its military capacity at home and with its proxies who are its foreign shock troops abroad. It’s been very, very you know, disadvantaged in that level. But the supreme leader, Khomeini, had to decide, right, exactly what to do so that he didn’t, he hopes, invite an even stronger U.S. response and that the regime survives. Is that a calculation that was going on, do you think, in the establishment as they made this response?

MOUSAVIAN: Christiane, I think always there has been a miscalculation on both parties and also western countries all they — frequently have made and have had miscalculations. We remember the eight years’ war when the U.S., Europe, Soviet Union, all Arab countries, were united to support invasion of Saddam, and provided money, weapon, the most sophisticated weapons for the aggressor. Even that time, Iran did not have missile. And the narrative was
that oh, Shah is gone and Iranian army is in disorder, this is the best time to attack and disintegrate Iran. And then, despite of the consensus internationally from the Eastern Bloc to Western Bloc, Arab countries, everybody supported with hundreds of millions of dollars, sophisticated weapons and everything. At the end, Iranian resisted 8 years and did not give a millimeter of the land. And Saddam is gone and the Islamic Republic is there. I mean, this is always the wrong narrative hearing —

AMANPOUR: OK. OK. So, let me ask you then to follow up on that. I mean, we’re talking about the 1980s. And at that time the leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, said that, I will have to drink reluctantly from the poison chalice, right, the cup of poison in order to end this war. Is that what

Khamenei is going to have to do? Because Trump has said, you know, surrender or else, or we need to, you know, make peace or else. Is there a calculation beyond this response that the supreme leader has to make?

MOUSAVIAN: When in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini said about the poison, it was because before this statement, he said he’s going to fight until Saddam is removed. The only decision he made, he decided not to continue the war until Saddam is removed. Otherwise, he could save the
country with his leadership.

But about the current crisis, what is the most important issue on the table? Is it about nuclear or beyond? I personally believe Prime Minister Netanyahu, his objective is not nuclear, is regime change is even this disintegration of Iran.

Whether this is American objective or not, this is the big question, whether President Trump only does not want nuclear bomb and his issue is only nuclear, or he is after regime change. If he is after regime change, then you can thing about a further escalation, regional war, transregional war, and a total disaster.

But if his issue is about Iranian nuclear bomb, they have three major issue on the table.

One is about Iran cooperation with the IAEA to resolve technical ambiguities, technical questions, or possible military dimension issues.

As secretary Kerry said the 2015 nuclear deal contains the highest level of transparency and verification and inspection measures. Therefore, on this issue, they can exactly implement the transparency parameters of the same deal because the deal was already implemented and all IAEA technical ambiguity were removed.

The second big issue is about the Iranian stockpile. First of all, as John Kerry said, Iran was not going to have such a big stockpile. President Trump withdrew from the deal while Iran was in full compliance with the deal, then and in return, Iranians also minimized their commitment within the JCPOA and try to increase the level and capacity of the nuclear program as a bargaining chip.

AMANPOUR: I understand what you’re saying, as a bargaining chip. But clearly, they misjudged, they misread the room, they misread Israel after October 7th. They misread Trump. And they — this bargaining chip clearly backfired against them. So, the real question is, if they want to get back to a table, are they going to, as Kerry suggested, remove — I mean, I’m extrapolating, remove this commitment to the destruction of Israel and actually go to some consortium, which you, I think were involved with, which involves basically threading the enrichment needle, what they need for nuclear program that’s civilian, but of formal Iranian territory. Is that going to be what they might do?

MOUSAVIAN:  I really don’t know what would be the final position of Iranian government because I’m not in the government, but I believe and have written for two years that there is a need for ceasefire between Iran and Israel. Iran and Israel should go back to the U.N. charter and respect the U.N. Charter, not to threaten each other. They should respect the U.N. charter.

The second is about the nuclear deal, about the stockpile. I heard Araghchi actually told Steve Witkoff during the first three random negotiations that if there is a deal, Iran would be ready to export or to dilute the 400- kilogram of stockpile. Therefore, there would be no worry about Iran to make 10 nuclear bombs.

And finally, the concern is about whether Iranian enrichment would be about military enrichment or civilian enrichment. If Iran enriches below 5 percent, definitely this is civilian.

And in mid-term and long-term, as I have already written, there could be a regional consortium between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Emirate, Qatar and other countries supervised by International Atomic and Agency, like European Urenco Consortium. This would be multilateral supervised by International Community.

AMANPOUR: And then, last thing then is, because you’re a former nuclear negotiator I, asked the deputy foreign minister, Mr. Ravanchi, before the U.S. entered this war, whether if the regime survives. because you have said, you know, you think the Israeli position is regime change, that they would ghosts in — you know, in secret and actually take a decision to make a bomb because of what’s happened. And he said, no, never. We never have, we never will, et cetera. Do you think they might if this doesn’t get back to a negotiating table? Is that an option like North Korea that’s left on the table?

MOUSAVIAN: It depends to the end state of the current situation. If the U.S. and Israel would stop attacking Iran, Iran will stop. If the U.S. comes back to negotiation table, Iran would come. If the U.S. would respect international rules, laws, regulations, which is NPT, Iran would be ready to make a deal and accept the highest level of transparency, open nuclear program, and then go to consortium. But if the objective is regime change and they are using the nuclear just as an instrument to bring this country to a total collapse, I think Iranians ultimately would go for nuclear bomb.

AMANPOUR: Gosh. All right. Well, we’ve been warned Seyed Hossein Mousavian, thank you very much indeed.

With Secretary John Kerry

Secretary Kerry, welcome to the program. And of course, so important to have you. And you negotiated the only diplomatic arms control accord, if you like, with Iran over its nuclear deal. First, I need to ask you about this Iranian response. Clearly a response was expected. What do you think from what you’ve heard, and we don’t even know whether any have hit their targets yet?

JOHN KERRY, FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE: Well, Christiane, thank you. Look. I’ve just heard about this just like you have. So, I have absolutely zero briefing or knowledge of exactly what’s unfolding. But clearly, Iran had to respond in some way and they made it clear that they would, and I think the administration anticipated that.

The real question now is, what’s the impact? How big? Is this a serious effort to counter in a warlike way, or is it a message? Is it a sort of message sender? And then, people will work in good faith to try to get to the diplomatic table?

I mean, what’s important to remember here is there’s no military solution to this. This can go on and on. It could get uglier and more and more dangerous with greater and greater implications for a global basis. This is very dangerous.

My hope is that this is more performative than consequential and that it will satisfy their need to be able to respond. I think President Trump needs to clearly — it’ll be very judicious about measuring that and understanding it, and hopefully, take the higher ground of getting back to
the table for the simple reason that we don’t have any visibility anymore, insight or real — the depth of insight that we had with the nuclear agreement that we put in place.

I mean, with the nuclear agreement we put in place, we had huge insight as to what they were doing. We had stopped them from developing in whole sectors. We have destroyed their plutonium reactor, which they were weeks away from being able to have bomb material. We were able to have, you know, tens thousands of centrifuges destroyed. We required them to destroy the core of what existed in Fordow. And they did, they dismantled. They were under watchful eyes from the International Community.

Remember that we brought five nations and the United Nations to the table, and we put in place the strongest nuclear agreement that has been agreed to by any countries, anywhere in the world since the 1950s or ’60s. And so, we just need to get to a negotiation in order to be able to really solve this problem.

AMANPOUR: OK. So, I want to ask you about that, but first I want to ask you one more question about this because, as you said, it was highly telegraphed. Iran has been saying since the, you know, U.S. attack that it would have to respond. And some have called for a big response, some of the hardliners inside Iran. But what does — I mean, you know, the U.S. obviously has experience with this. When Trump ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds force of the IRGC, it was clearly telegraphed that there would be a response from Iran. And from my memory, it, it did hit a base but did not cause the damage and death that it could have caused. And that was what people said was a telegraph calibrated face showing — showing face response.Do you think this Trump administration, depending on what is the result of this, do you think him and the people around him would understand that or he’s promised to retaliate in his speech overnigh, the Trump, if Iran hits any U.S. target?

KERRY: Christiane, it’s impossible for me to speculate as to exactly what’s going on in either the president’s mind or the National Security team. And I just don’t want to do that. I do think people have to be realistic here in understanding what the choices are. Iranians — Iran is a proud, proud, proud nation. One of the things I learned in my negotiations was the level of pride was just enormous. They also have been committed to the destruction of Israel. That’s a cultural, almost religious component of their policy. And so, it’s very hard to say what exactly is going to bring them back to the table. But I know this, you cannot bomb away the memory of how to make a bomb. You can’t bomb away the knowledge that they have developed. You can’t bomb away, you know, the broad array of technicians who’ve been working on this for years who will go back to work if that’s the mission they’re given by the leadership of the country.

AMANPOUR: OK.

KERRY: And one of the dangers here is that the more this goes on in a military way, the more power goes to the worst defenders within Iran, the IRGC. And that’s not good for anybody.

AMANPOUR: Well, just quick, I want you to clarify that because there’s a whole amount of talk now, even Trump is saying, and I don’t know whether he is being egged on by the prime minister of Israel or the others who have regime change in their mind. But you have just raised a potential result of regime change, that it’s not some happy clappy democracy overnight, it could be a much harder line. And you’ve just raised the Revolutionary Guard and others have as well. Do you fear that that is a risk that could happen?

KERRY: I think it’s an enormous risk. I think it’s beyond a risk. It’s the greater likelihood because they’re the people with the guns and with the military power. And if you look at Evin Prison and the way people have been treated and so forth, we know that these guys aren’t — haven’t been natural good actors in so many ways.

You know, I think that what’s important here, I mean, none of us who’ve been involved in this over the years look happily at the choices that Iran has made, feeding the power of Hezbollah, the Houthis, supporting Hamas, and engaging in internal activities that we inherently really find
repugnant. But we have to find a way to try to solve a problem. That’s what we did with President Obama. You know, we had a lot of choices. We had the MOP back then. In fact, this bomb was developed some time ago, back in 1991, and then refined. It hasn’t been used since. But the fact is that we have other options available to us. We came — I mean, the model of what happened with the prior agreement is really a significant marker for what needs to happen now. And the Iranians, you know, in fairness here, I mean, I don’t like, as I’ve described, much of the behavior and I think that what a United States, the military showed they could do and did the other day is a remarkable operation and they deserve enormous credit if that’s the choice that was made.

But that choice has to translate into a diplomatic process, and I don’t know if it’s possible to restore what was there before. We had massive insight as to what they were doing in their program. Yes, it was very worrisome what the IAEA reported a few days ago. But if we didn’t — if we hadn’t pulled out of the agreement and if we hadn’t subsequently, you know, taken the positions we’ve taken with respect to how you negotiate, we could have really come back to a place of reasonable —

AMANPOUR: Well, then, I want to ask you – this is very —

KERRY: This has to calm down somehow.

AMANPOUR: OK. But about the negotiations and you know, what happened, of course, you said, we pulled out, President Trump in his first term pulled out of that deal. So, this is what we’re getting from a former nuclear negotiator who basically said about the negotiations that then were interrupted by Israel’s first bombing round about 10 days ago.

So, this negotiator says that they had agreed, both the Iranians and Steven Witkoff, the special — you know, the special envoy, on a draft. They –and then they were meant to go to another round on the Wednesday and then further rounds on that weekend, which they then didn’t. The United States, he says, canceled the Wednesday meeting and Witkoff changed its position to zero enrichment. As you know, there’s been shifting U.S. positions. Trump had first said they could have some, they can’t have a bomb ever, like everybody says. But then it changed radically. And they — then they, you know, met for another round. Witkoff stayed very shortly. Left the meeting. And then they agreed to meet on the Sunday. And as we all know what happened.

So, you know what changed was the administration decision not to let any enrichment on Iranian soil. So, then tell me about how you get back to diplomacy when the Iranians believe that this was a deception just to allow Israel to attack and they — and then, obviously, the U.S. decided to join? And then, apparently, they were going to talk about this consortium thing about having enrichment off site, so to speak, to thread that needle.

KERRY: Right.

AMANPOUR: So, to me it looks like there was a missed opportunity at diplomacy. I don’t know what it looks like to you.

KERRY: Well, I don’t know all of the details. I mean, you’ve certainly got some reporting there. I can’t vouch for it.

AMANPOUR: Right.

KERRY: I’m not being negative about it. I just don’t know if that’s the way it unfolded. What I do know is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has for years been seeking to bomb Iran. And he came to the Obama administration and asked, he subsequently tried to persuade other presidents. And it didn’t until now become a reality. So, what changed in that is something I’m not – – I’m able to — certainly, I’m not going to speculate publicly about it, but it — you know, something obviously did change.

But again, let’s come back to the reality of where we are, Christiane. We don’t want this to be a wider of war. The whole region doesn’t want that. The world doesn’t want that. It’s the last thing we need. And the issue is what’s the off-ramp now that we have, in fact, bombed? And that off-ramp is going to take a considerable amount of diplomatic effort and restraint at this particular moment.

If everybody goes whole hog, including Israel and the United States joining together, this is going to be one of the wildest confrontations that we have seen, because it’s not going to be one that is controllable. And you have the entire Middle East, you have Russia, China, India, others who will have very strong views about, you know, where this started and how it started.

This is the danger of having pulled out of the agreement, just pulled out. And the IAEA said at the time, the agreement was working, Iran was living up to that agreement. And they didn’t get the full sanctions relief. And then the president pulls out and they decided, OK, how do we defend ourselves now? I’m not in — you know, supportive of any of the choices that Iran has made.

They’ve been, you know, worse than mischievous within the region and have caused a lot of suspicion and doubts about their longer intent here. But good diplomacy now has to take the lead. And the president, I hope, will exercise restraint and take the higher road in order to try to get back to that table, which is so critical.

You cannot stop this process. I mean, where is the material that was in Fordow? Where — you know, as I said, you cannot bomb away the memory and the established procedures that they have now learned. They’ve mastered the nuclear cycle. They know how to make a bomb. The only issue is, will they find some way now to feel compelled to do that or will they want to join the community of nations and begin to come to a commerce place and reach some kind of an accord? And as I say, that’s going to be very difficult.

AMANPOUR: So, the deputy foreign minister, who you probably also know, might have been part of the JCPOA negotiating team, Ravanchi, said to me that —

KERRY: He was.

AMANPOUR: Yes, exactly.

KERRY: At that time.

AMANPOUR: Yes. He wanted to — they wanted to continue —

KERRY: I know him quite well from that.

AMANPOUR: — even now since the American bombing, they — he has said that they will not pull out of the NPT. That was a fear that they would pull out of this, you know, observing role by the NPT and then go even further dark and further underground. But to your point about the intelligence, about — and this is crucial because it’s — you know, it’s — all those years ago, this happened in Iraq, and Trump actually said, you know, in his 2016 campaign, Iraq was a big fat mistake, those are his quotes. And he accused the, you know, government of lying about intelligence that they — and as we know, there were no weapons of mass destruction.

So, he was very clear that he opposed that. Now, we’re having another debate on the intelligence about weapons of mass destruction, which is, as you’ve said, in the intelligence says, Iran does not have. But here is what Secretary Rubio said on the Sunday morning show when asked about the intelligence, which is also U.S. intelligence, here’s what he said.

AMANPOUR: I mean, you know, I’ve got deja vu all over again. This is precisely the argument that was made as a justification for the war in Iraq, which turned out to be a disaster for the United States and for the region. So, are you concerned that your successor, Secretary Rubio, does –believes that any intelligence is irrelevant? This intelligence anyway.

KERRY: I think it’s a bigger question than that, frankly. The decision to the best of our knowledge in the intel community had not been made, but he is absolutely correct. They have the materials they need.

AMANPOUR: Right.

KERRY: And the — there was a rather alarming report by the IAEA to the effect that they had about 60 percent level of enrichment, and they had increased their — increased the level, you know, of their amount of enriched material available to be able to make a bomb.

So, you know, that creates a cause for worry. It doesn’t necessarily create a cow’s bell eye, as we know, where you automatically go in. You can show at the table, this is what we know, this is what you’re doing, and this is how we negotiated with them for over three years, and we fought over these things. But we got a final agreement that had television cameras in every single facility, radio seals on all of their centrifuges. If they’re

opened, you would know it.

We had 130 additional inspectors on the ground who were personally going in and making these inspections. We had centrifuges destroyed. So, they had no program fundamentally. And we had the incredible visibility on that program, and we were able to tell exactly what they were doing. So, that if they didn’t keep their agreement, we still have the ability to bomb them. And we made that very, very clear. If you do not live up by this, then you are subject to the possibility of a military solution.

AMANPOUR: Right.

KERRY: But they chose to go the other route and we chose to go the other route. And we literally had a nuclear weapon taken off the table. And some people tried to say, well, it’s sunset. No. Only a couple of provisions in its sunset. The agreement stayed in effect as long as Iran, for a hundred years, 200 years was dealing with uranium and dealing with enrichment.

We had total guarantee of insight, and we had something called the additional protocol, which provided even more insight than ever before in these nuclear agreements. So — and we did that, the nuclear additional protocol came about because of what happened with North Korea, where North Korea said it was going to do A, B, C, and didn’t. So, we came with a whole new regime, new protocol to be able to deal with that problem.

AMANPOUR: All right.

KERRY: So, that’s really the issue, if you don’t want to have a wider war, which apparently maybe a few people want, but if you don’t want to have a wider war, and I think the broad array of nations in that region are really nervous about what might happen here, it’s the last thing that we leave on this planet is yet another war and continued escalation.

AMANPOUR: Yes.

KERRY: So, I hope wiser voices will prevail, and we’ll find the road ahead.

AMANPOUR: Well, listen, thank you very much for this because you were there in the room and you did get a deal, and we’ve seen the danger now come to a head when that deal was thrown out. Secretary of State, John Kerry, thank you very much for being with us.